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A B S T R A C T
The balance sheet is commonly used as a deliberative approach to decide best interests
in Court of Protection cases in England and Wales, since Thorpe LJ in Re A (Male
Sterilisation) described the balance sheet as a tool to enable judges and best interests
decision-makers to quantify, compare, and calculate the different options at play. Recent
judgments have critically reflected on the substance and practical function of the balance
sheet approach, highlighting the practical stakes of its implicit conceptual assumptions
and normative commitments. Using parallel debates in proportionality, we show that
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the balance sheet imports problematic assumptions of commensurability and aggrega-
tion, which can both overdetermine the outcome of best interests decisions and obfus-
cate the actual process of judicial deliberation. This means that the decision-making of
judges and best interests assessors more generally could fail to properly reflect the na-
ture of values at stake, as well as the skills of practical judgment needed to compare such
values with sensitivity and nuance. The article argues that critical reflection of the bal-
ance sheet makes vital space for a more contextualised, substantive mode of deliberation
which emphasises skills of qualitative evaluation towards enhancing conditions of articula-
tion around the range of values involved in best interests decision-making.
K E Y W O R D S : Balance sheet, Best interests, Judicial deliberation, Mental capacity law,
Practical reasoning, Value incommensurability
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Where a person is deemed to lack capacity to make a decision on her own behalf, the
balance sheet is commonly used as a deliberative approach to decide what should be
done, in her best interests, in Court of Protection cases in England and Wales.1 The
balance sheet as a best interests decision-making tool in cases concerning health and
welfare decisions for adults first emerged in Re A (Male Sterilisation), where Thorpe
LJ articulated a semi-quantitative exercise, looking at the potential gains or losses of a
particular course of action. In his words,
[a]t the end of that exercise the judge should be better placed to strike a balance
between the sum of the certain and possible gains against the sum of the certain
and possible losses. Obviously only if the account is in relatively significant
credit will the judge conclude that the application is likely to advance the best
interests of the claimant.2
The suggestion, therefore, was that the balance sheet would enable judges to quantify,
compare, and calculate the different options at play.
The influence of Thorpe LJ’s approach has been profound. He had anticipated that
the procedure was only to be provisionally used ‘[p]ending the enactment of a check-
list or other statutory direction’.3 Neither a checklist nor any other statutory direction
1 The device is also used in family law cases, both before the Family Division of the High Court and in the
Family Court. However, our focus in this article relates to the balance sheet as a deliberative tool in Court
of Protection cases (and mental capacity law cases concerning adults decided under the inherent jurisdiction
of the High Court prior to the coming into force of the Mental Capacity Act 2005). For an early critical
analysis comparing best interests under the Children Act 1989 and the (then) new MCA, see S Choudhry,
‘Best Interests in the MCA 2005: What can Healthcare Law Learn from Family Law?’ (2008) 16 Health
Care Analysis 240. In relation to child and family law, see also A Daly, ‘No Weight for “Due Weight”? A
Children’s Autonomy Principle in Best Interest Proceedings’ (2018) 26 Intl J Children’s Rights 61.
2 Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 560 F-H.
3 Crucially, the adoption of the balance sheet has not been accepted across the board amongst the judiciary.
Former Senior Judge Denzil Lush was particularly resistant to this approach.
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has been forthcoming4 aside from the requirements of section 4 of the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA)5 and many judicial decisions have subsequently upheld the
balance sheet as the informal standard of best interests deliberation. More recent judg-
ments, however, gesture towards growing critical reflection around the form, sub-
stance, and practical function of the balance sheet approach, with McFarlane LJ
describing it as an ‘aide memoire . . . and not a substitution for the judgment itself’.6
Others, such as Hayden J, describe how ‘the balance exercise is qualitative rather than
numerical’7 and, elsewhere, he states even more critically that the balance sheet ap-
proach is unhelpful because ‘[i]t does not really accommodate the enormity of the
conflicting principles which are conceptually divergent’.8
Arguably, Hayden J’s observation about conceptual divergence has been operating
as an implicit assumption within best interests decision-making: alongside the balance
sheet approach is often a deliberative appeal to ‘magnetic factors’, whereby certain val-
ues or considerations are presumed to have priority or significant weight of some
kind. The explicit challenge to some uses of the balance sheet in more recent judg-
ments is notable, not only because it problematises the underlying consistency of
these two deliberative tools working side-by-side in best interests decisions, but also
in how it raises fundamental questions around the role of values and substantive prac-
tical judgment in deliberation about best interests under the MCA, as conducted by
judges or legal, social work, and health and social care practitioners.
In this article, we demonstrate how recent disagreement around the form, sub-
stance, and practical function of the balance sheet has normative and practical signifi-
cance. As we argue below, its normative significance is two-fold. First, there seems to
be a growing recognition that best interests decision-making must depart from (even
suggestions of) a simple calculation of benefits and losses, because by its nature, such
deliberation appeals to goods and values that resist the questionable normative com-
mitments implied in the concept of balancing, such as value commensurability, unitary
notions of the good, or the existence of a single ‘cover value’. Secondly, statements by
MacFarlane LJ, Hayden J, and others are an important first step in correcting a core
conceptual misunderstanding underlying the way that the balance sheet has been ap-
plied thus far, which may help shed further light on limitations around the imagery
and language of balancing more generally as a deliberative tool in best interests
decision-making. The concept of balancing implies commensurability, in that it
remains a possibility to quantify different options within a singular scale, based on a
common measure or value. However, rendering values commensurable is different
from comparing and deciding between conceptually divergent goods. As Hedley J aptly
referred to his task in Re GM, ‘[t]his is very much a comparison of apples and pears
and trying in the context of it to strike the best interests [sic] with as broad a view of
4 cf s 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 which requires the court to have regard to seven statutory criteria (re-
ferred to by practitioners as the ‘welfare checklist’) when making certain decisions in the best interests of a
child.
5 Setting out a series of steps that must be taken and factors to be considered by a person determining what is
in another’s best interests for purposes of the Act.
6 Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882 at [52].
7 Re N [2015] EWCOP 76 at [52].
8 NHS Foundation Trust v QZ [2017] EWCOP 11 at [25].
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those interests as it is possible to do’.9 Thus, the balance sheet as a more extreme iter-
ation of the deliberative act of balancing is effectively being used as a tool of compara-
bility, but whether it can discard the problematic assumptions of commensurability
remains an important question that demands further scrutiny.
Critical comments by the judiciary might suggest movement away from the bal-
ance sheet in best interests deliberation in mental capacity jurisprudence. However,
the requirements under section 5 of the MCA mean that judges in fact conduct only a
very small proportion of best interests decision-making. When we look in more detail
about how the statutory requirements have been fleshed out for those undertaking
acts in connection to the care or treatment of P, it is important to note that the statu-
tory Code of Practice to the MCA 2005—to which those discharging functions under
the MCA must have regard—refers to the balance sheet at paragraph 5.62 (see also
Section II below). Guidelines for legal, social, and health care practitioners also consis-
tently recommend and endorse the balance sheet approach as a structured deliberative
tool that is an essential part of the section 4 best interests checklist, with some explic-
itly referencing the approach of the judiciary, such as Thorpe LJ’s judgment in Re A.10
Its prevalent use in contexts prior to, as well as within, the courtroom setting thus sug-
gests that there are important practical stakes in clarifying and resolving the concep-
tual and normative issues we have set out above. If the balance sheet is applied
uncritically, best interests decision makers who use this device—including judges, bar-
risters, solicitors, and social and health care practitioners—risk taking up implicit
assumptions and commitments which could overdetermine the outcome of their best
interests decisions, or which poorly reflect the actual process of deliberation. These
commitments—and by default, the decision-making of best interests assessors—
would then fail to properly reflect the nature of values and goods at stake, as well as
the appropriate mode of deliberation or skills of practical judgment needed to compare
these with sensitivity and nuance. Moreover, critical reflection on the various underly-
ing commitments within the deliberative act of ‘balancing’ or ‘weighing’ as applied
most rigidly within the balance sheet exercise may make vital space to explore the
9 Re GM; FP v GM and A Health Board [2011] EWHC 2778 (COP) at [24].
10 By way of examples only, see Suffolk Safeguarding Adults Board, which refers to Thorpe LJ in Re A and
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Trust, Mental Capacity Act and Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards
Policy, where it states, ‘In taking best interests decisions in court, Judges have often used the ‘balance sheet’
principle, drawing up a list of the emotional, medical, social and welfare benefits and disadvantages (includ-
ing the likelihood of each benefit or disadvantage occurring) of the proposed alternatives’ (s 7). The balance
sheet approach is likewise used as part of the training of the MCA for social workers, see SE Laird, Practical
Social Work Law: Analysing Court Cases and Inquiries (Routledge 2010) 300. More explicitly, in H Carr and
D Goosey, Law for Social Workers (15th edn., OUP 2019) 611, the balance sheet is discussed as part of the
social worker’s toolkit and ‘use of [the balance sheet document] is recommended by the President of the
Family Division, the Association of Directors of Children’s Services, Cafcass, HM Courts and Tribunals
Service, the Department of Education, the Ministry of Justice, and the Chair of the Family Justice Board, in
compliance with the revised Public Law Outline (PLO) 2014’. A quick search reveals numerous other prac-
tice guidelines where the balance sheet is endorsed, including the Local Government Association and
ADASS, Putting the Mental Capacity Act principles at the heart of adult social care commissioning: A guide for
compliance; Wales Health Board, Lincolnshire County Council; West Sussex County Council; Manchester
Safeguarding Adults Board, Mental Capacity Act Policy and Procedures where, in Appendix 4, the balance
sheet is ‘[r]ecommended for all professionals undertaking sophisticated decisions, particularly where the
benefits are finely balance or in instances where there may be disagreement’.
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normative status and importance of other factors in best interests decision-making,
such as the role and status of the values of P, the subject of proceedings. Our focus on
the balance sheet in judicial best interests decision-making thus functions as an in-
structive gateway that helps contextualise and problematise its unreflective use in
applications of section 4 of the MCA, in cases where its inclusion in submissions to
judges help frame and inform their deliberations, as well as the many situations that
do not even make it to the courts. It also serves as a stimulus for consideration of
whether and how the balance sheet should be referred to in the next iteration of the
MCA Code of Practice, which is under review at the time of writing.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section I provides a legal analysis of the
balance sheet approach, as applied in the Court of Protection. Here we focus on pro-
viding a review of judicial disagreement around the function of the balance sheet, as
well as the interplay between this deliberative approach, judicial values, and the values
of P. In Section II the practical and conceptual problems with the balance sheet are
critically analysed through reference to analyses of the practice and theory of propor-
tionality, particularly in the application of human rights law. Rather than aim to ad-
vance new arguments around issues of balancing in debates about proportionality and
value incommensurability in the law generally, we bring together these different per-
spectives to shed light on the deeper theoretical and conceptual warrant behind scep-
tical remarks within the judiciary that question the deliberative appropriateness of the
balance sheet in mental capacity law. Section III accordingly delves deeper into the
theoretical presuppositions of the balance sheet, drawing attention to the ways in
which these presuppositions reveal a potential lack of fit between this approach and
the nature of the goods at stake in best interests decision-making, as well as the neces-
sity of practical reasoning and substantive evaluation in deciding between divergent
values and goods. We then, in Section IV, apply our theoretical analysis to the ques-
tion of whether judges and other best interests decision-makers can justifiably appeal
to the balance sheet, and if not, to how they should reason about best interests in the
process of their decision-making. To be clear, this article does not aim to critically ana-
lyse the best interests standard.11 Rather, our conclusions suggest that a critical lens
towards the balance sheet will pave the way for a more contextualised, normatively ex-
pansive, mode of deliberation with particular emphasis on utilising evaluative language
and advancing conditions of articulacy around the range of values involved in the de-
liberation of best interests.
11 For further critical discussion of the best interests standard, both in relation to mental capacity law and as it
relates to children, see M Dunn and others, ‘Constructing and Reconstructing ‘best interests’: An
Interpretative Examination of Substitute Decision-making under the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2007) 29 J
Social Welfare & Family L117; J Coggon, ‘Mental Capacity Law, Autonomy, and Best Interests: An
Argument for Conceptual and Practical Clarity in the Court of Protection’ (2016) 24 MLR 396; M
Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2009) 17 MLR 1; M
Donnelly, ‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to Say Goodbye?’ 24 MLR 318; LM Kopelman,
‘The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of all Ages’ (2007) 35 J L, Med &
Ethics 187; D Degrazia, ‘Value Theory and the Best Interests Standard’ (1995) 9 Bioethics 50.
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I I . J U D I C I A L D I S A G R E E M E N T A R O U N D T H E B A L A N C E S H E E T
The legal genealogy of the balance sheet shows its transition from provisional advice,
to its adoption as a standard deliberative tool in best interests decision-making in rela-
tion to children and incapacitated adults, and then to growing reservations amongst
the judiciary. The balance sheet was introduced, as indicated above, by Thorpe LJ in
Re A (Male Sterilisation).12 The case concerned a young man with Down’s syndrome,
A, who was being cared for by his mother. His mother was concerned that when,
given her ill health, A moved into local authority care he might have a sexual relation-
ship and be unable to understand the possible consequences. She applied for a decla-
ration that a vasectomy was in his best interests. The judge at first instance found that
while A was sexually aware and active, he did not understand the link between inter-
course and pregnancy. However, he refused the declaration on the basis that the effect
on A would be minimal. His mother appealed, which was ultimately unsuccessful, but
Thorpe LJ took the opportunity to give some more general observations. He noted,
relying upon the speeches of the House of Lords in Re F,13 that there could be ‘no
doubt . . . that the evaluation of best interests is akin to a welfare appraisal [of a
child]’.14 Thorpe LJ further reviewed the Law Commission’s report on mental (in)ca-
pacity law15 and the Government’s response16 to the effect that there had to be an ‘ex-
tensive’ evaluation of best interests.
In the passage then frequently cited thereafter, from which we have already drawn
in the introduction, Thorpe LJ went on to say:17
[p]ending the enactment of a check list or other statutory direction [as to how
best interests is to be evaluated] it seems to me that the first instance judge with
the responsibility to make an evaluation of the best interests of a claimant lack-
ing capacity should draw up a balance sheet. The first entry should be of any
factor or factors of actual benefit. In the present case the instance would be the
acquisition of foolproof contraception. Then on the other sheet the judge
should write any counterbalancing dis-benefits to the applicant. An obvious in-
stance in this case would be the apprehension, the risk and the discomfort inher-
ent in the operation. Then the judge should enter on each sheet the potential
gains and losses in each instance making some estimate of the extent of the pos-
sibility that the gain or loss might accrue. At the end of that exercise the judge
should be better placed to strike a balance between the sum of the certain and
possible gains against the sum of the certain and possible losses. Obviously only
if the account is in relatively significant credit will the judge conclude that the
application is likely to advance the best interests of the claimant.
12 n 3 above.
13 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] AC 1.
14 n 3 above at [559].
15 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity: Law Commission Report 231 (Law Commission 1995).
16 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Who Decides? Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults
(Lord Chancellors’s Department 1997).
17 n 3 above at [560].
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Thorpe LJ noted that he suggested this approach:
only because [the first instance] judgment in the present case seems to me to
concentrate too much on the evaluation of risks of happenings, some of which
seem to me at best hypothetical. A risk is no more than a possibility of loss and
should have no more emphasis in the exercise than the evaluation of the possi-
bility of gain.
Although Thorpe LJ had expressly only indicated his approach pending the enactment
of a check list or other statutory direction, when the MCA came into force on 1
October 2007, its attendant Code of Practice made express reference to Re A in a
footnote to the underlined sentence in paragraph 5.62:
It is important that the best interests principle and the statutory checklist are
flexible. Without flexibility, it would be impossible to prioritise factors in differ-
ent cases – and it would be difficult to ensure that the outcome is the best possi-
ble for the person who lacks capacity to make the particular decision. Some
cases will be straightforward. Others will require decision-makers to balance the
pros and cons of all relevant factors. But this flexibility could lead to problems in
reaching a conclusion about a person’s best interests.
Whether because it was referred to in the Code of Practice or otherwise, the balance
sheet has continued to be used in best interests decision-making for adults, in particu-
lar in medical treatment cases, even as interpretation of what it requires has inevitably
evolved from Thorpe LJ’s original approach in line with increased case law decided
under the MCA. A review of cases decided between 1 October 2007 (when the MCA
2005 came into force, and the ‘new’ Court of Protection started hearing cases) and 1
March 201918 found that 64 cases made express reference to a balance sheet, and, in
particular in medical treatment cases, observations often made along the lines that the
use of such a tool is ‘conventional’.19 As had been done prior to the coming into force
of the MCA 2005,20 some decisions have referred also to the balance sheet in the con-
text of welfare decisions.21 In 2012, former Senior Judge Lush noted that:
When carrying out a best interests’ analysis in health and welfare cases, judges of
the Court of Protection generally apply what is known as “the balance sheet
18 The review was carried out through searches on Westlaw, as the single most comprehensive database of
judgments. Some cases had neutral citations suggesting that they were decided in the Family Division or
Chancery Division (an example being Re P [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch)) but were, in fact, Court of Protection
cases. To be clear, this search was not carried out for the purposes of conducting a systematic review of the
case law but to provide a comprehensive and useful overview of how the balance sheet has evolved in judi-
cial decision-making. Our methodology reflects this purpose and the analysis of our article does not hinge
on a systematic review of cases.
19 A NHS Trust v K [2012] EWHC 2922 (COP); (2013) 129 BMLR 61 at [45] per Holman J.
20 Re S (Adult’s lack of capacity: carer and residence) [2003] 2 FLR 1235 at [14], where Wall J held that the ap-
proach of Thorpe LJ was ‘authoritative’ guidance for the court should go about deciding which outcome
would best serve the welfare of the ‘mentally disabled person’.
21 See, eg Westminster City Council v Sykes [2014] EWCOP B9.
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approach” and then look for any “factor of magnetic importance” which may tip
the balance, so to speak.22
The reported cases do not, in fact, bear out the proposition that judges ‘generally’ ap-
ply the balance sheet approach, at least expressly, although Senior Judge Lush may
well have been drawing upon his own personal, anecdotal, experience in a context
where most decisions of the Court of Protection are not, in fact, encapsulated in a
reported judgment.23 There are also reported cases in which the balance sheet has
been used in cases concerning property and affairs, although in this context on occa-
sion a closer examination of how the term is used shows that the balance sheet under
consideration is, in fact, the balance sheet of factors that P would have taken into
account.24
Despite its continued use, however, judges have expressed reservations as to the
utility of the balance sheet approach. In some cases, this is because of the nature of
the decision to be taken: most obviously in relation to decisions as to whether life-
sustaining treatment should be continued in the context of a person in a permanent
vegetative state, in which it has (questionably) been held that there is nothing to put
in the balance in favour of continuing life.25 Former Senior Judge Lush also expressed
his doubts as to the utility of the balance sheet in property and affairs cases concerning
adults lacking the material decision-making capacity.26
More recently, the courts, in relation to both children and adults, have cautioned
against the uncritical or simplistic reliance on the balance sheet. In Re F (Children),
McFarlane LJ (now President of the Family Division and Court of Protection) stated
that he:
entirely agree[d] that some form of balance sheet may be of assistance to judges,
its use should be no more than an aide memoire of the key factors and how they
match up against each other. If a balance sheet is used it should be a route to
judgment and not a substitution for the judgment itself. A key step in any wel-
fare evaluation is the attribution of weight, or lack of it, to each of the relevant
considerations; one danger that may arise from setting out all the relevant fac-
tors in tabular format, is that the attribution of weight may be lost, with all ele-
ments of the table having equal value as in a map without contours.27
Perhaps unsurprisingly, as judges of the High Court sitting as Court of Protection are
very largely drawn from those with a background in cases concerning children, such
22 Re JDS [2012] EWHC 302 (COP); [2012] WTLR 475 at [23]. The ‘factor of magnetic importance’ was a
term coined by Thorpe LJ in Crossley v Crossley [2007] EWCA Civ 1491, [2008] 1 FLR 1467.
23 See further the discussion in A Ruck Keene and others, ‘Taking Capacity Seriously? Ten Years of Mental
Capacity Disputes before England’s Court of Protection’ (2019) 62 Int J Law Psychiatry 56.
24 See Re G (TJ) [2010] EWHC 3005 (Fam) at [37] per Morgan J.
25 See eg Re CW [2010] [2010] EWHC 3448 (Fam), the first reported treatment withdrawal case after the
MCA 2005 came into force, relying upon Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. Lady Hale in Aintree
University Hospitals NHS Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67; [2014] AC 591 noted at [37] that ‘[t]here are
cases, such as Bland’s case [1993] AC 789, where there is no balancing exercise to be conducted’.
26 See, eg D v JC [2012] 3 WLUK 800; [2012] WTLR 1211.
27 n 7 above at [52].
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judges have expressed similar concerns. In Cambridge University Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust v BF,28 Macdonald J noted that the approach in Re A was advanced
‘pending the enactment of a checklist or other statutory direction’. Citing Re F, he
continued: ‘Within this context, whilst the balance sheet is a very useful tool, having
compiled the same the court must still come to its decision as to best interests by ref-
erence to the principles set out above grounded in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 s. 4.’
The former Vice-President of the Court of Protection, Charles J, also noted a similar
reservation,29 and the current Vice-President, Hayden J, has been more trenchant. In
NHS Foundation Trust v QZ, a serious medical treatment case, he observed that the
case before him was not one where the Re A balance sheet was helpful. In a dictum
quoted in the introduction to this judgment, he held that the balance sheet ‘does not
really accommodate the enormity of the conflicting principles which are conceptually
divergent’.30 He continued:
It is very clearly established that the approach to evaluating the best interests of
P in these circumstances, under the framework of the Mental Capacity Act
2005, are the principles set out in section 4 of that Act. It is also, as Ms Roper
emphasised in her position statement, well established that there is no constraint
on the factors the court should take in to account when considering best inter-
ests. She emphasises this is an holistic exercise involving not only medical best
interests but the wider social and emotional gamut of a patient’s interests.
Although Miss Watson invites me to take a ‘balance sheet’ approach to the exer-
cise, such a process is, in my judgement, as MacFarlane LJ has stated [in Re F],
rather like a reading a map without contours, different factors plainly weigh
disproportionately.31
I I I . H U M A N R I G H T S , J U D I C I A L C O M P E T E N C E , A N D J U D G M E N T S
O F P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y
The foregoing genealogy of the balance sheet in the case law reveals diverging views
amongst the judiciary: though initially conceived as a list to help draw out ‘pros’ and
‘cons’, the balance sheet has also evolved into a tool that suggests the weighing up of
competing options. On one hand, it remains a ‘conventional’ tool that is frequently
endorsed as an appropriate deliberative mechanism to make best interests decisions,
not least within the current version of the MCA Code of Practice and in numerous
practice guidelines for social and health care practitioners.32 On the other hand, dis-
senting (and influential) voices amongst the judiciary, including the current President
and Vice-President of the Court of Protection, question its utility and function. The
more assertive statements cautioning the application of the balance sheet tool high-
light two notable features: first, certain judges are explicitly arguing for the application
28 Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v BF [2016] EWCOP 26; [2016] COPLR 411.
29 Briggs v Briggs [2016] EWCOP 53; [2017] 4 WLR 37, noting the need for a ‘holistic’ evaluation at [123].
30 n 9 above at [25].
31 ibid at [28].
32 The Code of Practice is under review at the time of writing.








/article/28/4/753/5934832 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 08 July 2021
of practical judgment in judicial deliberation in ways that extend beyond the mecha-
nistic act of balancing factors or weighing up of options. The fact that these voices
caution against adopting a mechanistic approach expresses the worry that this is in-
deed how the balance sheet in best interests decision-making is being deployed in
practice—whether amongst different judges, or the legal, healthcare and social care
practitioners charged with carrying out a balance sheet exercise as part of the best
interests checklist in their submissions. The rigid template in numerous practice
guidelines of the balance sheet33 attests to the temptation to treat the exercise mecha-
nistically, which may potentially explain the perceived need of certain members of the
judiciary to explicitly reject such an approach in recent judgments. Secondly, there is a
recognition that the nature of the cases and goods at stake in best interests decision-
making is poorly captured through the imagery and act of balancing and weighing—
thus raising critical questions about why judges remain committed to this language
and indeed, the balance sheet, despite recognising the temptation towards, and inher-
ent limitations of, overly literal depictions of balancing in deliberative tools.
These two issues echo longstanding parallel debates regarding the meaning of bal-
ancing in the proportionality doctrine, particularly in the context of constitutional and
human rights adjudication, further grounding the practical—and indeed principled—
concerns expressed amongst the judiciary.34 Such debates may also help explain the
ambivalence and contradiction in judicial critiques of the balance sheet—rejecting its
mechanistic overtones, on one hand, while cleaving to it as a deliberative tool, on the
other. We thus frame discussion of the practice and theory of proportionality in this
section to contextualise and bring to the forefront similar presuppositions that are em-
bedded within the balance sheet in mental capacity law. Following others, such as
Paul Craig, who challenge the exceptionalisation of debates concerning judicial values
and institutional competence in public law contexts,35 we are similarly interested in
exploring how existing criticisms of balancing in the proportionality doctrine may be
brought to bear on decision-making tools within mental capacity law—specifically
drawing out the deeper grounds on which we might question the use of the balance
sheet as a deliberative tool for best interests decision-making on behalf of individuals
who are deemed to lack capacity.
The relevance of proportionality adjudication may not be immediately apparent in
the context of mental capacity law. However, the European Convention on Human
Rights forms the backdrop to adjudication under the MCA. This is so in particular be-
cause the Court of Protection is itself a public authority under the Human Rights Act
1998, and thus bound not to act incompatibly with P’s Convention rights.36 The
Court is, furthermore, bound to follow principles of statutory interpretation to ensure,
insofar as possible, that the law is applied compatibly with P’s Convention rights.37
33 n 11 above.
34 There are likely other comparable areas of judicial practice that we could draw from to illuminate the analy-
sis in this article, but for the reasons presented in this section we find that debates on, and judicial reasoning
concerning, proportionality are particularly instructive and of particular relevance.
35 P Craig, ‘Limits of Law: Reflections from Private and Public Law,’ in NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul
Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of the Law (Hart 2016).
36 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(3)(a).
37 ibid s 3.
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And the relevance of principles drawn from human rights adjudication is practically
unavoidable because so much mental capacity jurisprudence operates within the
ambits of key Convention rights, such as Article 3 (the absolute right not to be subject
to inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 5 (the limited right to liberty and security
if the person), and, of particular interest for the purposes of the current discussion,
Article 8 (the qualified right to respect for private and family life). As Sir Mark Hedley
observes in relation to the application of Article 8, proportionality provides a back-
ground rule that dictates that ‘the least intervention [is] consistent with best interests’
and may even demand a wholesale reassessment of those best interests.38
As well as providing relevant direct points of context, we might also consider how
judicial evaluation of Article 8 impacts on non-MCA cases wherein judges are never-
theless required to undertake balancing exercises to determine questions associated
with the identification, weighting, and weighing of substantive personal values, individ-
ual autonomy, and concerns for a person’s welfare. Questions spanning adjudication
in this context include, for example, questions of whether there is a right positively to
define one’s own best interests in a medical context;39 challenges concerning rights as-
sociated with ‘assisted dying’;40 determinations of whether there is a right to smoke
tobacco;41 or a right to have access to a needle exchange programme for recreational
drug use.42
There is a wealth of literature that explores judicial approaches to proportionality
assessments. With the advent of the Human Rights Act, the courts may be seen to
have been afforded a role as a check on executive activity that is more intensive than
was the case given the previously existing grounds of judicial review. This raises ques-
tions of both constitutional and institutional competence, each underpinned by cri-
tiques of the nature of decision-making that is appropriately undertaken by the
courts.43 Lord Steyn’s dicta in the case of R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department44 explain the position, and how and why ‘the intensity of review is some-
what greater under the proportionality approach’ than under the previously existing
grounds of judicial review:45
The contours of the principle of proportionality are familiar. In de Freitas v
Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing
[1999] 1 AC 69 the Privy Council adopted a three stage test. Lord Clyde
38 M Hedley, The Modern Judge: Power, Responsibility, and Society’s Expectations (LexisNexis 2016) 53. See also
K v LBX [2012] EWCA Civ 79.
39 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin); R (Burke) v General Medical Council
[2005] EWCA Civ 1003.
40 R (Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61; R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45; R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice
[2014] UKSC 38; R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWCA 2447.
41 R (N) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] EWCA Civ 795.
42 R (Shelley) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1810.
43 See eg J Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174;
K Syrett, The Foundations of Public Law: Principles and Problems of Power in the British Constitution (2nd edn,
Palgrave: 2014) ch 5, especially 233–38; J Sumption, Trials of the State: Law and the Decline of Politics
(Profile Books 2019).
44 [2001] UKHL 26.
45 ibid at [27].
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observed, at p 80, that in determining whether a limitation (by an act, rule or de-
cision) is arbitrary or excessive the court should ask itself:
‘whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limit-
ing a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objec-
tive are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.’
Clearly, these criteria are more precise and more sophisticated than the tradi-
tional grounds of review. What is the difference for the disposal of concrete
cases? . . . I would mention three concrete differences without suggesting that
my statement is exhaustive. First, the doctrine of proportionality may require
the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck,
not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions.
Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of
review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight
accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the heightened scrutiny
test developed in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 is
not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights.46
The focus in human rights claims raises substantive questions about whether there
has been an interference with an applicant’s Convention right(s), rather than atten-
tion to the process by which a decision was reached. And if the proportionality of a
decision is under issue, the question, following the test as stated in Lord Steyn’s
speech above, requires a balancing exercise. As Lord Bingham held in R (Begum) v
Denbigh High School Governors,47 having given direct reference to Lord Steyn’s words:
There is no shift to a merits review, but the intensity of review is greater than
was previously appropriate, and greater even than the heightened scrutiny test
. . .. The domestic court must now make a value judgment, an evaluation, by ref-
erence to the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time[.]48
Importantly, the extent to which balancing represents a mechanistic or impressionistic
exercise is unresolved in these judicial statements and likewise remains subject to vig-
orous debate in jurisprudential theory. Formal proponents, such as Robert Alexy, de-
pict balancing as a legally constrained decision-making procedure that helps judges to
arithmetically determine the conditional relation of precedence between competing
principles within the particular circumstances of a case.49 While rejecting balancing
within the precision of a scale of infinitely expressible gradations between 0 and 1,
Alexy advances a ‘Weight Formula’ that allows judges to express legal propositions
against weightings of (say) light, moderate, and serious. Thus, rights are permitted to
be weighed through a method that permits of numerical representation and to be
46 ibid.
47 R (Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15.
48 ibid at [30].
49 R Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433.
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balanced with ‘concrete weight’ given to them within the factual context of the partic-
ular case. In this way, the weighing of interests is treated as a quantifiable, comparative
procedure,50 purportedly arbitrating competing interests and principles using the lan-
guage of ‘more’, ‘less’, ‘equal’, without appeal to substantive moral reasoning or non-
legal, subjective values.51 Indeed, ‘it does not locate principles in a distant and
unreachable heaven of values, but drafts them down from their abstract, and one
might say, principled level, in order to render them fruitful by way of a process of ra-
tional argumentation in the individual case’.52
This mechanistic model is not without its critics, however, with both defenders
and opponents of proportionality quick to ‘rescue’ an impressionistic model of balanc-
ing, or abandon balancing altogether as a mode of judicial decision-making. Common
amongst these critics, however, is a shared scepticism that balancing can achieve the
level of mathematical precision purported in formal accounts and that such precision
is even desirable where conflicting rights, interests, and principles are at stake. As
Kahn writes:
The concept of ‘balancing’ is itself both a metaphor and an abstraction. The
metaphor is ambiguous. It describes both a process of measuring competing
interests to determine which is ‘weightier’ and a particular substantive outcome
characterized as a ‘balance’ of competing interests. The abstract concept of bal-
ancing, furthermore, tells us nothing about which interests, rights, or principles
are weighted or how the weights are assigned.53
Critics of the formal approach to proportionality charge that this mechanistic ap-
proach to balancing incorrectly presumes a common metric and commensurability of
interests and rights which misrepresents the nature of the goods at stake.54 Even with-
out the literal arithmetic formulas espoused in formal approaches to balancing, the im-
age of the scales is deeply evocative of a single cover value capable of weighing up
opposing rights and interests. Not only does this reflect a fundamental category mis-
take—attaching the quality of sameness to that which is qualitatively different—but
the consequences are equally worrying, whereby quantification implies the delibera-
tive logic of trade-offs and optimisation requirements, resulting in human rights being
50 M Jestaedt, ‘The Doctrine of Balancing – its Strengths and Weaknesses’ in M Klatt (ed), Institutionalized
Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (OUP 2012) 157.
51 See FJ Urbina, ‘Proportionality in Medical Law’ in AM Phillips, TC de Campos and J Herring (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of Medical Law (OUP 2019) 172; S Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on
Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468, 474.
52 ibid 158.
53 PW Kahn, ‘The Court, The Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell’
(1987) 97 Yale LJ 1.
54 n 51 above; FJ Urbina, ‘Is It Really Easy: A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing as Reasoning’ (2014)
27 Can JL & Jur 167; FJ Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 OJLS 575; VA da Silva,
‘Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles Balancing and Rational Decision’ (2011) 31
OJLS 273.
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‘balanced away’ or ‘sacrificed’.55 This deliberative logic as such is fundamentally inap-
propriate to the rights, principles, and interests at issue.
Moreover, if no single cover value can measure divergent rights, interests, or goods,
then deciding between them will involve a complex and intuitive deliberative process
that goes beyond a legally constrained, formal process removed from substantive con-
tent. The formal understanding of balancing mistakenly suggests that the deliberative
process is a quantitative rather than evaluative exercise, yet the complex nature of
competing rights and values necessitates practical judgment that is flexible, open-
ended, and capable of being responsive to changing circumstances. Balancing thus falls
short of the promise of providing genuine insight into what happens in the delibera-
tive ‘black box’. Though its formal proponents imply deliberation is reducible to an al-
gorithm which purportedly generates legally constrained, justifiable results, in reality,
what emerges instead is ‘a characteristically impressionistic assessment of the relative
weights of competing considerations, which does not lend itself to rational reconstruc-
tion of the argumentative path that has led to a particular decision’.56 In other words,
the misleading imagery and procedures of balancing hide the actual substance of judi-
cial deliberation which involves the qualitative evaluation of conflicting principles or
values.57
As already indicated above, judges at the highest level have stated within the body
of their dicta how values inevitably are at play, with judgments of proportionality
reached through the qualitative evaluation of these values. The nature of such qualita-
tive evaluation is provided in Section III of this article, but a striking representation, in
relation to the balancing of precisely the sorts of values that might feature in a Court
of Protection best interests assessment, can be brought if we contrast the reasoning of
the majority and minority in the Court of Appeal in R (N) v Secretary of State for
Health.58 Here, the court was considering whether detained psychiatric patients
should, under Article 8, enjoy a right to smoke: a right, if it existed, that they could
not enjoy both by virtue of the policy of the NHS Trust under whose care they were
detained, and by virtue of the expiration of an exemption that had been provided
through Regulation 10 of the Smoke-free (Exemption and Vehicles) Regulations
2007.
Establishing whether such a right existed was inevitably going to be an evaluative
exercise, with the majority ultimately holding that: ‘Difficult as it is to judge the impor-
tance of smoking to the integrity of a person’s identity, it is not, in our view suffi-
ciently close to qualify as an activity meriting the protection of article 8.’59 However,
the majority continued, obiter, to consider and present reasons why, had there been
an interference, it would have been proportionate:
55 Urbina (n 52); J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (trans W Rehg, Policy 1996).
56 Tsakyrakis (n 51) 482.
57 See C Kong, ‘Beyond the Balancing Scales: The Importance of Prejudice and Dialogue in A Local Authority
v E & Ors’ (2014) 26 Child & Fam LQ 216.
58 R (N) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] EWCA Civ 795.
59 ibid at [49], per Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony MR and Moses LJ. Per Keene LJ.
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[T]here is strong evidence of the dangers of smoking both to smokers and to
those subject to SHS [second-hand smoke] and powerful evidence that in the
interests of public health a complete ban was justified in appropriate circumstan-
ces. We further agree that substantial health benefits arose from the ban and, as
experience has shown, that the disbenefits were insubstantial. As to SHS, there
has emerged powerful evidence of its dangers which supports the trust’s case on
justification in a way which might not have been the case in the past. In all these
circumstances we agree that the trust’s policy would be justified under article
8(2) if article 8 were engaged at all.60
That a judge might come to an alternative view is unarguable, given the dissenting
opinion of Keene LJ, who held that the regulations that permitted a ban for detained
patients in secure psychiatric hospitals did indeed breach Article 8:
To a non-smoker like myself the importance of the activity of smoking to some-
one who smokes regularly or who may have smoked for many years is not easy
to gauge, but it is apparent that to such people it is a pastime greatly valued.
One knows of writers and journalists who cannot write without smoking, while
others seem to obtain great personal pleasure from smoking after eating or other
activities. A large percentage of the adult population seems unable to work with-
out smoking at intervals during the day. Less anecdotally, there is the implicit as-
sumption by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its Sixth Report that
smoking is an activity, interference with which would engage Article 8 . . .. It
seems to me that for many people it forms an important part of their personal
lives and possesses a value which reaches a level which qualifies for protection
under Article 8 as part of their personal autonomy. . . .61
Keene LJ’s assessment of proportionality similarly highlights the complexities of such
a balancing exercise:
I readily acknowledge that, in assessing proportionality in a matter like this,
weight has to be attached to the position endorsed by the democratically-elected
body. However, nothing put before this court demonstrates that Parliament ever
appreciated that in reality the consequence of Regulation 10(3), the time-limit
on exemption for mental health units, was likely to be a complete or virtually
complete ban on smoking for those detained in secure mental hospitals. There
was no debate on the merits of such an outcome, which means that there has
been no democratic endorsement of it. Ultimately, the decision is one for the
court. In the light of the matters to which I have referred, it seems to me that
the prohibition in England on smoking in institutions like Rampton, a prohibi-
tion which results from the cessation of the exemption in Regulation 10 plus the
60 ibid at [72]. It should be noted that as well as the challenge to the Trust’s policy, referred to here, the judges
held that for the same reasons the non-provision of an ongoing exemption in the regulations would have
been proportionate for the same reasons.
61 ibid at [100].
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security considerations applicable there, is more than is necessary to accomplish
the public health objective of protecting people against second-hand smoke. It is
therefore disproportionate, and there is a breach of Article 8.62
The approach to legal reasoning in this case (one of many from which we may have
drawn) demonstrates the strengths, in practice, found in the critics of formal
approaches to proportionality. Some defenders of proportionality, however, incorpo-
rate those criticisms to expound on a more informal, intuitive approach to balancing,
arguing that the more formal model departs from the reality of its judicial application.
For instance, Waldron describes the coherence between claims of weak incommensu-
rability and the procedure of balancing, where the ordinary meaning of weighing up
divergent goods implies ‘the reasoned articulation of our moral principles and priori-
ties’ rather than quantification about competing values.63 Balancing as a judicial tool
can therefore be understood in this ordinary sense rather than the formal approach to
proportionality.64 Möller likewise pushes against the assumption that proportionality
imposes a common metric on rights and principles. Instead, balancing functions as
shorthand for the open-ended, unconstrained moral deliberation that reasons between
principles, values, and interests characterised by weak incommensurability.65
But in the process of incorporating the incommensurability objection against pro-
portionality, balancing becomes a catch-all deliberative tool, effectively trivialising its
distinctive legal function. As Urbina writes, ‘[p]roportionality cannot simultaneously
allow for open-ended moral reasoning about the right decision to the case – thus
avoiding the objections made to the maximization version of proportionality and pro-
vide legal guidance – thus obtaining the benefits of legally directed adjudication’.66 To
put a slightly different slant to Urbina’s point, moves to ‘save’ balancing from its critics
risk distortions from two directions. From one direction, balancing loses its specialised
legal function and continues to mask the actual phenomenon of moral judgment
which carries the actual deliberative burden in evaluating divergent principles, rights,
and interests. From another direction, we risk distorting the distinctive nature of the
rights, principles, etc. at stake, because the evocative imagery of balancing continues
to oversimplify the complexity of these goods.
62 ibid at [108].
63 J Waldron, ‘Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer’ (1994) 45 Hastings LJ 813. In
challenging the presumption of commensurability, however, one need not be committed to a strong thesis
of incommensurability, which adds the additional and more questionable claim of incomparability: that is,
since no single metric applies to competing values, this means that they are likewise incomparable; or that
attempts to compare them are destined to be irrational, arbitrary, or are experienced as tragic loss. Few sub-
scribe to strong commensurability in this sense. We as individuals, let alone judges, constantly compare val-
ues and choices we technically cannot quantify. Sometimes tragic loss does accompany such choices, but
not all the time. It is still the case that we do bring values into relation with each other, recommending weak
incommensurability views like Waldron’s which assert that conflicting values or principles can still be subject
to rational comparison and choice, even lexical ordering.
64 Indeed, some first-hand descriptions of judging seem to refer to balancing in this sense. See EW Thomas,
The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles (CUP 2005).
65 K Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’ (2012) 10 Intl J Constit L 709.
66 Urbina, ‘Is It Really Easy’ (n 54) 192.








/article/28/4/753/5934832 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 08 July 2021
Returning to mental capacity law, the controversies and debates around the theory
and practice of balancing in the proportionality doctrine can be said to track the broad
contours of judicial discomfort around the use of the balance sheet in best interests
decision-making. For example, similar concerns of value incommensurability are
expressed in Hedley J’s reference to comparing ‘apples and pears’ and in Hayden J’s
identification of conceptually divergent, conflicting principles. Likewise, the pervasive
force of optimisation and quantification connotations in balancing are evident in judi-
cial statements questioning the function of the balance sheet exercise. Holman J, for
example states in A and B v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council:67
I have read and re-read those ‘balance sheets’ and all the written closing submis-
sions, and I have all the points listed there in mind. Judges frequently use the
language of ‘balance’ and ‘balance sheets’ (and I do myself. I think lists such as
the above are indeed very helpful). But the analogy with balancing scales may be
misleading. When weights or objects are put on either side of a scale, their indi-
vidual precise weights are known, or ascertainable. You can put four objects in
one scale pan and seven in the other, and the scales will come down one way or
the other due to the aggregate of the individual precise and ascertainable weights
on each side. In a case such as this, however, none of the factors have precise
weights. All that may be said of any individual factor is that, as a matter of judg-
ment, it is more or less important or weighty than another.68
Holman J’s statement recognises the impressionistic as opposed to mechanistic nature
of deliberation around the complex matter of best interests. It might be the case that
judges do indeed refer to the balance sheet as a shorthand for an ‘aide memoire’, or
the type of commonsense, intuitive comparisons we do on a regular basis in making
practical judgments, seemingly akin to the weak incommensurability argued for by
Waldron. Nonetheless, the criticisms expressed in the judgments of Hayden J,
MacFarlane LJ, and Hedley J reveal the difficulty in shedding the figurative connota-
tions of mechanistic deliberation, quantification, and commensurability in the judicial
practice of balancing, even as Waldron and Möller eschew its reductive assumptions.
For this reason, we share Urbina’s scepticism that balancing more generally remains
an apt legal tool that makes sufficiently explicit the impressionistic determinations of
judges.69
Equally, conceding to the impressionistic nature of judicial decision-making raises
the additional spectre of longstanding critiques that best interests judgments simply
amount to judges and other decision-makers expressing subjective opinions that are
imposed on others. For example, Ian Kennedy strongly criticises the best interests test
as ‘not really a test at all’ but a ‘crude conclusion of social policy’ that ‘allows lawyers
and the courts to persuade themselves and others that theirs is a principled approach
67 A and B v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council [2014] EWFC 47.
68 ibid at [85].
69 Urbina, ‘Is It Really Easy’ (n 54) 181.
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to the law’ which amounts to a form of ‘ad hocery’.70 Through the veneer of a contex-
tualised approach which effectively atomises the law, he continues:
The court can then respond intuitively to each case while seeking to legitimate
its conclusion by asserting that it is derived from the general principle contained
in the best interests formula. In fact, of course, there is no general principle other
than the empty rhetoric of best interests; or rather, there is some principle, but
the court is not telling. Obviously the court must be following some principles,
otherwise a toss of a coin could decide cases. But these principles, which serve
as pointers to what amounts to best interests, are not articulated by the court.
Only the conclusion is set out. The opportunity for reasoned analysis and scru-
tiny is lost.71
Though Kennedy’s criticisms emerge in a context where best interests was either
interpreted under the ‘substituted judgment’, pre-MCA Chancery regime, or risk-
driven analysis under the Mental Health Act, they nonetheless articulate clearly the
potential dilemma facing judges and best interests decision-makers more generally
once formal deliberative mechanisms, like the balance sheet, are explicitly rejected.
And indeed, we would agree with Kennedy’s analysis to some extent: deliberative
principles, such as balancing and its expression through the balance sheet, do indeed
obscure the deeper reasons and values motivating a best interests analysis. However,
we would suggest that this indicates a promising direction, where best interests delib-
eration becomes geared towards the more transparent articulation of values underly-
ing such complex decisions, rather than revealing a domain of ad hoc, subjective
judgments or the innate emptiness of the best interests standard. But to properly har-
ness this potential, it is particularly urgent to clarify the reasoning behind these more
complex judgments in mental capacity jurisprudence: how do values and valuing im-
pact these judgments? How does this practical reasoning look—what does it means
to judge certain factors as possessing ‘magnetic significance’, compared to other fac-
tors? What are the phenomenological and normative features of such evaluative delib-
eration? We explore these aspects further in the next section.
I V . V A L U E S A N D P R A C T I C A L R E A S O N I N G
Thus far, questions and contradictory views around the theory, function, and sub-
stance of balancing in proportionality help hone in on analogous issues within adopt-
ing the balance sheet approach in mental capacity law. One might argue that this
means ‘saving’ balancing from more reductive formulations to capture more common-
sensical intuitions about comparing and deciding between competing goods—as
attempted by Waldron and Möller. Judicial unease expressed about the mechanistic
assumptions implicit in the balance sheet indicate, however, that the problem with bal-
ancing goes beyond a simple matter of linguistic or definitional retrieval—that the for-
mal, quantitative connotations evoked in its imagery, and enshrined in dicta such as
70 I Kennedy, ‘Patients, Doctors and Human Rights’ in R Blackburn and J Taylor (eds), Human Rights for the
1990s (Mansell 1991) 90.
71 ibid.
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Butler-Sloss P’s assertion in the case of Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) that ‘the best
interests test ought, logically, to give only one answer’,72 are difficult to dislodge in
practice.
Ultimately, the deeper problem with the balancing imagery lies in the fact that it
obscures and limits the scope of legitimate reasons which contribute to the decision-
making process. Formal approaches to balancing prove to be so attractive because
they attempt to provide a clear formula to decide between difficult options in accor-
dance with a process that (at least) aspires to be as value-neutral as possible, where ad-
herence to rule-of-law constraints and the avoidance of extra-legal values in judicial
reasoning are upheld as laudable legal virtues. From this standpoint, the domain of
moral values is dismissed as expressing ‘subjective’ or extraneous considerations that
are irrelevant to hard legal obligations. However, the normative force of competing
rights and goods commonly adjudicated in the legal sphere is derived from moral val-
ues that not only resonate within the socio-cultural context, but often involves valuing
them as irreducible goods which resists any benefits-loss calculus or trade-offs.
Though welfare decisions revolve around determining what is in the best interests of
a single individual, divergent rights and goods often get at the very heart of what is of-
ten thought to be valuable in human life, such as self-determination, physical and
emotional well-being, human intimacy and contact. It may well be true that some of
these values have become so incorporated in the law that it becomes difficult to de-
marcate their source.73 Even in those cases, disengaging from various sources of
value—whether they be moral, socio-cultural, religious, and so on—does not guaran-
tee better, more justifiable reasoning, or a just outcome for individuals. What results
instead is the distortion of what motivates our principles, rights, interests, and human
goods, and why these are held in high regard. As these values become removed from
their animating sources, the ensuing judgment appears as an unmoored legal declara-
tion, impoverished of crucial expressive and justificatory resources.74
For example, Sir Mark Hedley writes eloquently about the deliberative nuances of
making difficult decisions in welfare jurisdictions, such as the necessary task of identi-
fying relevant and sometimes conflicting values in welfare cases. The fact that these
values are distilled through the interpretive prism of rights does not remove the reality
of the underlying values at stake, nor that judges need to decide between them. As he
suggests, ‘these areas are deeply affected by human emotions, which may not be effec-
tively constrained by rationality but could be seriously constrained by what is practica-
ble’.75 Rather than shy away from the value-laden nature of best interests decisions, he
argues that it is the judge’s role to address competing sets of values, represented by
those of society, the person who is subject of proceedings, the family or families, and
the judge herself.76 Often identifying these values will be elusive and shifting, but it is
notable that Sir Mark Hedley states,
72 Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2000] 3 WLR 1288, at 27.
73 J Raz, ‘Incorporation by Law’ (2004) 10 Legal Theory 1.
74 CR Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ (1996) 144 UPA L Rev 2021.
75 n 39 above, 48.
76 Sir Mark Hedley does not mention P’s values, but we would argue that these are automatically activated in
light of s 4 of the MCA.
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[W]e cannot ignore the values of the judge. It is unlikely that they will be re-
ferred to in the judgment; indeed, they may just be those cultural assumptions
of which we are so unaware or at least do not articulate. My background has pre-
sumably imbued me with assumptions that have simply become part of me and,
however self-aware I try to be, I will not spot everything. That will not stop
them affecting my thinking. All this must go into the welfare pot.77
This means that ‘best interests are not purely rational’, demanding ‘the exercise of dis-
cretion [that] involves a deeply human judgment that may not always accord with
purely rational assessment [but is] governed neither by culpability nor sentiment’.78
Sir Mark Hedley moreover calls into question the illusion of some objective
weighting to values: actual practice reveals that taking seriously the conflicting values
or goods in best interests decisions involves rejecting this kind of putatively precise
measurement. Consider the common dilemma of determining the best interests of
whether an older person with dementia should stay at home or be placed into care
against their wishes. When moral values are excluded, it is easy for the logic of risk
aversion and optimisation to take hold—the predominant reasons which tend to mo-
tivate public bodies. He writes:
Such a culture is always likely to prioritise physical protection because that is
what can be measured. In a care home, the protected person will be kept warm,
clothed, fed and provided with stimulating activity. That can be seen and mea-
sured, but emotional deprivation in sadness, isolation, and the loss of sense of
belonging are not readily susceptible to measurement. Likewise, at home squalor
can be measured (and professionals criticised) but a sense of security cannot.79
The lure of measurement lies in its impression that disparate goods can be maximised,
reaching a concrete, ‘right’ answer. The practical reality, however, is that in deliberat-
ing difficult cases involving conflicting rights, where there is ‘more than one reason-
able answer but only one decision’80 a judge is left with a core question: ‘Was I right?
I simply do not know . . . [T]he breadth of the human condition affected by those
rights means that their actual outworking (rather than their basis) is somewhat
diffuse’.81
Sir Mark Hedley’s observations attest to the difficulty of identifying (or even being
able to identify) the value sources that inform their judgment. But they also gesture
towards two other interconnected points about evaluative attitudes and practical rea-
soning respectively. First, the elusiveness of measurement tells us something about
the very nature of, and judicial evaluative attitudes towards, the goods at stake in diffi-
cult best interests cases. Limiting or excluding different sources of value from the
77 n 39 above, 50–51.
78 ibid 54, 53.
79 ibid 65. See also CR Sunstein, ‘Incommensurability and Valuation in the Law’ (1994) 92 Mich L Rev 779,
who also notes how welfare, utility, costs and benefits analyses seem to invite the assumption of measure-
ment and exclude other, more diverse qualitative forms of evaluating goods in the law.
80 n 39 above, 54.
81 ibid.
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space of legitimate judicial reasons would effectively express a failure to value certain
rights, goods, and principles in ways that are fitting to the profound issues at stake in
best interests cases. In the scenario of the older gentleman, for example, it means
allowing the logic of risk management—and thereby measurable outcomes—to have
a priori significance, disregarding goods which resist measurement, such as the equally
valid and important claim of emotional security and belonging. In other words, draw-
ing from a richer, more substantive pool of reasons indicates that one is attuned to
the ways in which particular circumstances require valuing things in the right way—as
appropriate to the kinds of goods that they are, ie as situated within a socio-cultural
context, imbued with personal and intersubjective significance and potential moral
connotations.82
Closer examination of the evaluative attitudes adopted in claims of commensurabil-
ity and incommensurability help flesh out this point. Commensurability implies the
possibility of extrinsic valuing, in so far as goods are not good in and of themselves
but help maximise or achieve something else. Their value is therefore derived from an
external source. As Anderson explains, extrinsic values fall under an aggregative princi-
ple which prescribes the maximisation of a particular value; the total amount of value
dictates the appropriate response. Values as such are scalar and used to assign weights
to certain goods, in order to rationally decide between which is ‘weightiest’ or of
‘most value’.83 In these scenarios, trade-offs between goods are permitted, where
something can be sacrificed if it increases the aggregate, justified according to the logic
of maximisation.
In contrast, claims of incommensurability involve the attachment of intrinsic value
to certain goods—where value is derived purely from traits internal to the particular
good. The value of our partner or our child is inherent to their very being, their partic-
ular traits, and so on: we do not need to appeal to other sources to justify why we
value them. Indeed, an appeal to some external justification to explain their value
would appear odd. If one stated, ‘I care for my child because of the status I gain from
my friends’ or ‘I love my partner because of the tax deductions’, it would be a valid
question to ask whether one truly valued one’s child or partner. Not only would this
type of reasoning be seen as potentially abhorrent, but it would be criticised as an im-
proper expression of what it means to respect, love, esteem, and care for something (ie
intrinsic to the evaluative attitude itself) as well as what it means to respect, love, es-
teem, or care for something that ought to be valued for its own sake (ie prescribed by
the very nature of the valued good). Intrinsic values are therefore guided by attitudes
which have a distributive form, focusing on the assignment of status rather than weight
or aggregative value to goods. This distributive principle resists making trade-offs in
the name of maximisation and, instead, directs us ‘to distribute our different kinds of
82 Part of the difficulty in being able to identify the range of values (and value sources) does not just concern
the lure of measurement in contemporary political and social discourse, but also the overarching philosophi-
cal difficulty in articulating, and doing conceptual justice to, the form and practical application of non-
consequentialist values—a problem that is pervasive (not just in day-to-day practical moral reasoning, but
in academic fields relating to health care and in bioethics itself), leading to the poverty of normative scholar-
ship in these fields.
83 E Anderson, ‘Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods’ in R Chang (ed), Incommensurability,
Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press 1997) 103.
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concern to each of the intrinsic goods in our lives. Thus, choices concerning those
goods or their continued existence do not generally require that we rank their values
on a common scale or choose the more valuable good; they require that we give each
good its due’.84 Needless to say, what and how we give each good its due operates
within a sphere of intersubjectivity in which its practical dynamics and consequences
will be liable to difference, disagreement, or indeed consensus, depending on when
the ranking is performed by a person on her own behalf or by another (say, a judge)
for P, and how that ranking is generated and justified. Yet beneath these potentially
conflicting views will often be a common distributive attitude in how the goods at
stake are valued.
V . R E C O N F I G U R I N G J U D I C I A L R E A S O N I N G A B O U T B E S T
I N T E R E S T S
Importantly, the deliberative nuances of judicial decision-making about best interests
affirm the normative significance of the distributive principle outlined above. Put neg-
atively, inappropriately adopting an aggregative attitude towards intrinsic goods equa-
tes with a failure to give each good that which it is due. This is where the analogy or
metaphor of the balance sheet, and indeed the very terminology of the ‘best’ in best
interests, goes awry, particularly in the temptation to interpret claims of status by ref-
erence to weight, believing that ‘in an ideal world, a best interests decision would be
able to enhance all these aspects’,85 or that, as framed in a dictum quoted above, as a
matter of principle ‘the best interests test ought, logically, to give only one answer’.86
The reality is that the framework of the law as it stands means that the judge is re-
quired to make a decision on behalf of the person who is deemed to lack capacity.87
But though a decision has to be made, irreconcilable tensions between equally strong
arguments can mean not all dimensions of best interests pull in the same direction,
even in cases where some broad overlapping consensus might be achieved.88 To re-
turn to Sir Mark Hedley’s example, it may well be the case the judge places the older
adult in a care home, prioritising physical protection over his emotional comfort.
Others might take the view that this is not the best decision that could have been
reached, but its justification necessarily demands the judge to adopt a distributive atti-
tude in light of the nature of the goods being evaluated and more importantly, the obli-
gation that must be discharged to the individual as a bearer of rights.89 The judge—if
she is not to invite legal appeal or public criticism—has to express her attunement to
the gravity of the choice in the individual’s life, as well as the significance of her obliga-
tion to that individual. As Pildes writes, ‘[e]fforts to avoid the difficulties posed by
treating values as sometimes incommensurable fail to acknowledge the way social rela-
tions and individual experiences depend upon appreciating values in certain ways’.90
84 ibid 104.
85 n 39 above, 64.
86 Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) (n 72) above, per Butler-Sloss P, at 27.
87 See Secretary of State for Justice v KC and C Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (Mental health: All) [2015]
UKUT 376 (AAC) at para 37.
88 n 39 above, 64–65.
89 n 83 above, 106; also Sunstein (n 79).
90 RH Pildes, ‘Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought’ (1992) 90 Mich L Rev 1520, 1549.
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How then should a judge reason practically such that she approaches the relevant
goods and values by displaying the correct distributive attitude? Here, a broader scope
of practical reasoning in best interests decision-making is required, both in terms of its
defined function and the specification and evaluation of the permissible reasons that
are invoked to settle the matter at hand. On one hand, the appeal of balancing lies
precisely in reducing the practical reasoning process to a fairly simple rational calculus
of various options. When one adopts this position, so long as all the inputs are accu-
rately accounted for and the calculations are consistent, a single ‘right’ answer to the
problem is possible. However, there might not be one right answer for the parties or
even for P herself. Should we be more concerned with a person’s physical health
rather than the intimate relationship that harms her? Do the person’s religious views
trump preserving her life? Physical, mental, emotional, spiritual, and relational dimen-
sions all jostle with one another in best interests decision-making, and they do so pre-
cisely because the individual in question is leading a life that is characterised
fundamentally by multiple, divergent intrinsic values.
It might be thought that this leaves judges in an invidious position, not least as
they cannot simply decline to make a decision. And in so far as critical reflection is
consequently invited, we might welcome, for example, the candour expressed by
Jackson J in A Local Authority v E. Following a best interests assessment that included
an explicit representation of and engagement with a balance sheet, but prior to pre-
senting his conclusion, the judge stated: ‘The balancing exercise is not mechanistic
but intuitive and there are weighty factors on each side of the scales.’91 The founda-
tions to such a statement are likely explained by our reasoning above, and the frank
admission of the place of intuitions is admirable in its honesty.92 The question that
follows, however, is whether recourse to a judge’s intuition is inevitable and desirable.
Even if someone were to contest the claim of an inevitable resort to intuition, the
above reflections suggest that the adjudicative functions prescribed by the MCA place
demands on judges (as they do with other best interests decision-makers) to draw
from and apply values that are contingent, unsettled, and inherently subject to poten-
tial disagreement. In regard to the practical reasoning conducted by judges in the pro-
cess of arriving at a legal determination, this is not a matter that even in principle may
be resolved by exclusive reference to the law. If there is such a thing as a satisfactory
best interests determination, it is by its nature not something that may be achieved,
even in principle, without methods of reasoning that expand beyond ‘the legal’. ‘Neat’
resolution, in the senses that are espoused even within idealised accounts of the exer-
cise of judicial wisdom, are not theoretically possible. And this in turn serves as a call
for the development of methods of understanding and reasoning within judicial prac-
tice that are, in formalist senses, alien to the law.
The reality of ‘the hard choice’ therefore rightly challenges the narrow procedural
function of practical reasoning that is implied in the balance sheet, which presumes
91 A Local Authority v E [2012] 1639 (COP); [2012] HRLR 29, at [129].
92 Though Jackson J nonetheless uses the imagery of the scales in deciding in favour of the presumption of
life, it is revealing how powerful the balancing analogy remains and how it prevents the explicit articulation
of the intuitive judgments carrying the burden of his decision.
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that a single, right answer can be generated by following a formal deliberative mecha-
nism. Indeed, as judges are aware, in discharging their task of best interests decision-
making, a judge must engage in difficult but crucial evaluative work prior to making
any rational calculus. This is because the complex, multi-faceted constitutive elements
of best interest judgments almost always involve appeal to intrinsic values. To make a
decision in such cases, judicial reasoning must draw on language that goes beyond the
fulfilment of contingent ends or desires, an approach that invokes a vocabulary of
qualitative evaluations, such as dignity, worth, quality of life, or contrastive distinctions
of higher and lower, good or bad, noble or ordinary, and so on.93 Such evaluative lan-
guage is often bracketed due to fears that admitting its decisive role would imperil the
status of judges as impartial, objective observers, effectively allowing them to make
‘subjective’ or ad hoc, poorly justified decisions which are then illegitimately imposed
onto the lives of persons with disabilities. This worry tracks the widespread liberal in-
tuition that such individuals in public roles have an obligation to appeal only to rea-
sons that are putatively value-neutral.94 Yet, this objection is mistaken on two
grounds. First, it is wrong to immediately characterise evaluative judgments and their
grounding as ‘subjective’. Certain substantive goods and values in mental capacity law
(eg autonomy, right to life, health, and well-being) frame deliberations in judgments,
and their priority is warranted through broad societal and intersubjective consensus.
Secondly, there is the presumption that individuals can voluntarily shed themselves of
their value frameworks. Not only does this fail to reflect the phenomenology of best
interests deliberation as described by judges such as Sir Mark Hedley, but it removes
the crucial material which functions as the basis of one’s evaluation. Ultimately, draw-
ing on substantive value sources and our evaluations of worth is needed in order to
decide between incommensurable goods. These evaluations do not exist in the ab-
stract but come alive precisely through the ethical intuitions and conflicting values
that are activated in such difficult cases.
This is not to say that any or all evaluations ought to enjoy automatic warrant or
avoid critical scrutiny, and nor is it to suggest that merely speaking the language of val-
ues will be sufficient. Indeed, as Taylor shows, qualitative evaluation embeds the nec-
essary condition of articulacy. When faced with incommensurable options, invoking
the vocabulary of worth helps advance articulations as to why one proposition or rea-
son is found to be more elevated or superior to another.95 Articulations seek to con-
vey what might be implicit, confused, or inchoate. They contain their own normative
telos, in as much there is an aspiration for better, clearer, more comprehensible
descriptions of the predicament at hand and the qualitative evaluation of the goods at
stake.96
Aspirations for greater articulacy are poorly served by the mechanistic framework
of the balance sheet. A stark example is provided in Royal Bournemouth and
93 C Taylor, ‘What is Human Agency?’ in Human Agency and Language (CUP 1985) and C Taylor,
‘Explanation and Practical Reason’ in Philosophical Arguments (Harvard University Press 1995).
94 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 2009 [1971]).
95 n 94 above. Others (n 74 above) highlight the ‘expressive’ function of the law in this sense. We follow
Taylor in using the term ‘articulation’ rather than ‘expression’ due to the latter’s connotations of moral sub-
jectivism in the history of philosophy.
96 Rawls (n 94).
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Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TG, a case which revolved around the
question of whether an endotracheal tube should be removed from a woman who was
in a vegetative state, or whether it was in her best interests that it should be continued.
Perhaps implicitly observing its limited function, Cohen J himself stated that ‘I have
had to do’ the balance sheet exercise.97 He listed the various benefits and disbenefits
accordingly:
What on the one hand is the benefit of removal of the tube? First, it would be
the end of the process which brings, or is likely to bring no significant benefit to
TG. Secondly, it removes the possibility of indignity and/or pain. I do not think
there is more to be put in that column.
On the other side there is the continuation of life; there is the recognition of
her wishes for herself and for her family; thirdly, it enables her life to progress
and be ended in accordance with the will of God; fourthly, it permits the possi-
bility, faint though it may be, of some improvement in her state and fifthly, al-
though this may be repetitious, it provides the ability for her to play a part in her
family as she and they would wish, even though she would be unaware of it.98
Cohen J concluded:
I have come to the clear decision that it is in the patient’s best interests that intu-
bation should continue. I recognise that this places a huge burden on the treat-
ing team. It is against their advice and their wishes . . . but I remind myself con-
stantly, this is her life and her wishes as I have found them to be and nobody
else’s.99
Notably, the balance sheet does little to illuminate the determinative reasons behind
the judge’s decision, nor can it function to advance the condition of articulacy in the
sense that has been discussed. The various listed reasons on each side appear incom-
mensurable, but which reason is to be elevated over others is unclear. On its own, the
balance sheet merely sets out the incommensurable options rather than assisting to
clarify a pathway of deciding between them. It is only outside the balance sheet that
we learn of which reason has priority—namely TG’s life and wishes. Elsewhere in the
judgment, Cohen J further articulates the importance of the continuance of life
according to the wishes and feelings of TG and her family. Drawing on the statement
of her husband and children, he outlined two strands:
[F]irst, that if her presence was a comfort to others (as I find it to be) she would
want to be there whatever the cost to her. Family was central to her and she
would want to remain a part of the family no matter what form it would take for
as long as possible. Secondly, she had the utmost respect for life because of its
97 Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TG & Anor [2019] EWCOP 21 at
[28].
98 ibid at [28–29].
99 ibid at [30].
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intrinsic value and that it was for no-one other than the Lord to take away. It is
for Him alone to end and she would never accept anyone else facilitating death.
I also take into account the statement of her friend M who had a discussion with
her about Dignitas in the context of a programme on television and she recalls
TG saying, “Why do people want to go?” before adding something like “They’re
not God and they don’t know what will happen in the future.” It is absolutely
clear from everything that I have read that her Catholic faith and her belief in
God were and are a crucial part of her life.100
One might argue that Cohen J’s decision merely reflects the requirements in section 4
of the MCA, which stipulate that determinations of best interests must take into con-
sideration the values, wishes, beliefs, and feelings of P. At one level, this is true. At an-
other level, however, the elevation of TG’s wishes and feelings works towards
advancing judicial articulacy about a normative framework which recognises and ele-
vates the status of P’s perspective—and not simply P’s expressed subjective preferen-
ces (whatever these may be) but more specifically, P’s own contrastive, higher-order
evaluations that confer depth and meaning to his or her life overall. For instance,
Cohen J made a point of endorsing the Official Solicitor’s position statement that TG
would see her treatment in intensive care as aligned with her notions of the dignity of
life and divine providence.101 Here, judicial qualitative evaluations are attuned to P’s
own vocabulary of worth. Indeed, the condition of articulacy carries with it an associ-
ated requirement to track back and report precisely how and why a particular value or
good emerges in the context of P, in the circumstances of the case, as being of evalua-
tive significance worthy of articulation. Ways to focus this dialectical process of delib-
eration might be to focus on questions of status (‘what is it about the person and her
life that can be identified as being of value?’); magnetic importance (‘what values con-
cerning the person and her life stand out as being of particular significance?’), and the
narrowing down of reasons (‘given the person’s circumstances how do the values of par-
ticular significance provide reasons for acting in a particular way on her behalf?’). In
incorporating this dialectical process, the approach adopted by Cohen J thus attends
to any residual concern that reasoning outside the framework of a balance sheet risks
undermining the procedural legitimacy of the judgment.102 Best interests judgments
can be challenged, appealed, and reviewed accordingly through further deliberative
scrutiny in ways that accord with well-established legal processes.
Not all best interests cases will prioritise the values of P, and this is especially evi-
dent in some controversial circumstances where to do so would lead to her death.103
100 ibid at [24].
101 ibid at [25].
102 ibid at [24].
103 Compare two best interests cases decided by Peter Jackson J (as he was then), for example A Local
Authority v E & Ors [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) and Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60. This
is why, for example, our critique of the balance sheet approach does not attempt to replace it with an appeal
to other blanket mechanisms or meta-principles which take the subjectivity of P as the deliberative starting
and end point—such as an exclusive focus on P’s subjective will and preferences (as suggested in particular
readings of art 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), or a
substituted judgment test—on grounds that such approaches likewise seem unable to deal with the
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Attempts at greater articulacy are particularly important in interpreting the normative
direction of a legislative framework which better gestures towards respect for P’s val-
ues, wishes, beliefs, and feelings, as situated within the context of other values. The
particularistic and circumstantial nature of best interests, combined with the incom-
mensurable values and goods at stake, suggest that the articulations of judges have a
crucial part in making explicit and influencing the normative direction of best interests
judgments made under the provisions of section 4 of the MCA. All articulations are
not equal: some might be misguided, wrong, distortive, while others may be more
comprehensible and foster greater clarity. But such debate can only be had when the
misleading presuppositions of the balance sheet are dislodged in favour of an account
of practical reasoning which recognises the necessity of engaging with qualitative eval-
uations as the basis of sound judicial decision-making about a person’s best interests.
V I . C O N C L U S I O N
The balance sheet has an intuitive attraction to many decision makers under the
MCA, and not just judges themselves. As a template it has been adopted as a wide-
spread practical tool for legal, and social and health care practitioners as an essential
part of their section 4 best interests checklist for the (vast majority) of situations that
are addressed outside the courts. It seems to allow the reader of a judgment,104 or
best interests assessment, to see what the best interests decision maker has considered
to be relevant, and that they have considered relevant factors. But, based on the analy-
sis of this article, we suggest that little survives of the balance sheet as a deliberative
mechanism for deciding best interests at the level of theory and practice. Even defined
nominally as an ‘aide memoire’ of the factors to be considered, or as a placeholder for
the deliberative act of ‘balancing’ and ‘weighing’, it is only one tool amongst many in
making practical judgments around competing goods and values at stake, and cannot
displace the more substantive deliberative processes at play. Indeed, and as many of
the judges themselves recognise in different ways, the balance sheet does not in fact
assist them in reaching the decisions that they are required to reach.
This critique of the balance sheet is important for a number of reasons: first, it
means analysis of mental capacity case law can be more precisely focused on the im-
plicit phenomenology of values-based engagement in judicial deliberation about best
interests.105 Often the presumption is that the act of balancing is sufficient explanation
of the reasoning behind a best interests decision—yet as shown above, it obscures the
actual process of considering, evaluating, attaching significance to certain factors over
others. Secondly, our critique challenges the allure of mechanistic reasoning and
reveals how such a model of deliberation chafes against the distributive attitude that is
complexity and incommensurability of values. Nor do they encourage the conditions of articulacy we discuss
here.
104 As to whom judgments are addressed, including the place or absence of P as a participant in and addressee
of a judicial determination, see further J Harrington, L Series and A Ruck Keene, ‘Law and Rhetoric:
Critical Possibilities’ (2019) 46 J L & Society 302; J Harrington, Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law
(Routledge 2016).
105 As indicated above, we have not sought to relate the critical insights of this article to child and family law,
but there is likely application within the distinct approaches to best interests decision-making within that
sphere as well.
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demanded by such difficult cases involving competing intrinsic values in mental capac-
ity law. Whether a person’s emotional or physical well-being takes priority, whether
her autonomy trumps her safety—these fraught issues resist the language of trade-offs
and demand an orientation of valuing in ways that recognise their nature as intrinsic
goods. Finally, and importantly, the grounding and task of best interests decision-
making is reframed accordingly: setting aside the illusion of the balance sheet, with its
aggregative presumptions of commensurability, of quantitative comparison, makes
room for an alternative grounding which revolves around the qualitative evaluations
about conflicting, often incommensurable values; and a grounding that focuses on
how these evaluations might be identified and drawn into consideration. Rather than
lead to a domain of ‘ad hocery’ and subjective imposition, we would suggest that mak-
ing explicit the significance of evaluative judgments could help make best interests
assessors more adept at recognising and becoming more transparent about the depth
of goods and values at stake, as well as the different reasons that frame one’s
valuations.
This reframing is both urgent and timely: at the time of writing the MCA Code of
Practice is currently being revised and reference to the balance sheet ought to be criti-
cally reconsidered in light of our analysis, especially considering how the Code contin-
ues to inform the adoption of the balance sheet template in practical guidelines for
non-judicial best interests assessors. Though the statutory framing of the MCA
requires judges to make concrete best interests decisions in court proceedings, as well
as assessors to make decisions outside the courtroom, certainty of the ‘right’ answer
nonetheless often can and will remain elusive. Such uncertainty gives way to further
challenges in cases where, even in principle, there is no single ‘right’ answer; no
unique and preclusively ‘best’ determination. But such uncertainty is to be welcomed,
as the normative focus then becomes one of working towards greater articulacy about
a best interests framework that recognises and accords status towards P’s own qualita-
tive evaluations, while simultaneously appreciating that such decisions will inevitably
be situated within a broader complex nexus of values and value sources.
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